"Kant's great discovery which makes a sharp cut in the whole history of human thought and divides it into two parts, consist in this, that what refers merely to appearances and phenomena must not be transferred to what is noumenal, to "things in them selves". "The noumenal world was revealed to him as the world of freedom". Berdyaev.

By "numinous astonishment" is meant a feeling of being grip of the mystery (of existence (ontological shock) (1)*) yet elated with awe (2)*. This kind of experiences Tillich calls ecstacy; he does not mean a state of emotional excitement, though it may include this, but a state in which reason goes beyond its normal uses. This normal use is described as "the subject-object structure". Presumably the kind of reason which "goes outside this" is some state of immediate awareness in which we are not conscious of a gap between our thought forms and that of which we are aware. Something of this kind of immediacy happens in a low form of sense perception. Tillich is, I think, trying to describe an analogue of this in a spiritual nonsensory experience. Ecstatic reason is not the destruction of reason, but reason raised to a more creative level, in which the breach between theoretical detachment and affective union is overcome. So he says elsewhere that ecstatic reason in the practical sphere can be called grace, and in the theoretical, inspiration. However we may describe it, many would, I think, agree that something like what Tillich calls the ecstatic reason is a genuine experience. How much cognitive value has it? Tillich says that the ecstatic reason is the subjective side of a situation in which some event occurs which evokes it, and which can be called a "sign event", and in this sense a miracle. Revelation is the occurence of this whole situation (1)*. By relating revelation to the ecstatic reason, Tillich can speak of it in terms which do not demand a distinction of natural and supernatural. The vehicle of revelation is an experience, but it is an experience which has become charged with a sense of the depth and mystery of existence.

In place of the effort to adapt oneself to a dogmatic representation of Christ as an external ideal of perfection, Jung sees as the only valid meaning of the imitatio Christi for contemporary man the struggle to realize inner wholeness by being courageous enough to live out fully and passionately the unrepeatable meaning of one's unique existence. Jung's faith is not a faith in a transcendent God, but a faith in the soul's mystery as it becomes manifest in psychological experience. This mystery is 'God' experienced as a numinous force welling up from the depths. If Christ is 'the way' (John 14, 6) this way now has to be found in the depths of the soul: 'Personality is Tao, the way which is the soul's own immanent law, demanding truthfulness to oneself, not to dogmatic formulations.

By This I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing else but a transcendental subject of thoughts is represented = x, which is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of which, seperately, we cannot have the slightess idea (det sidste forhold benægter Berdyaev som Schopenhauer dog).

This unknown x makes itself known in or as an act of spontaneity. This means that it makes itself known as freedom, because spontaneity is free, and it is at this point that an opening appears into the realm of the noumenal. The unknownable I (Böhme siger at Kristus er vores Jeg'hed) makes itself known through its free, spontaneous acts ('Personality is not a substance but an act, a creative act' Scheler) It therefore appears in Kant's practical philosophy as the noumenal subject, which is free and morally responsible, even though empirically it necessarily hos to understand itself to be a part of nature, and is thus determined by necessary laws, which admit of no freedom. Thus Berdyaev can say: "The noumenal world was revealed to Kant as a world of freedom. He knows what the ting-in-itself is and it is only in respect of method that he gives the impression of knowing absolutely nothing about it".

Den religiøse åbenbaring, fx; begivenheden Kristus (Berdyaev; Tillich; Barth; Badiou); Damaskusoplevelsen, er en begivenhed, der ikke blot sker for mig. Den er en indre katastrofe i mig, og indtræffer denne katastrofe ikke med mig, er åbenbaringen uden betydning. Berdyaev

Rudolf Otto's Concept of the "Numinous"

Otto was one of the most influential thinkers about religion in the first half of the twentieth century. He is best known for his analysis of the experience that, in his view, underlies all religion. He calls this experience "numinous,"
and says it has three components. These are often designated with a Latin phrase: mysterium tremendum et fascinans. As mysterium, the numinous is "wholly other"-- entirely different from anything we experience in ordinary life. It evokes a reaction of silence. But the numinous is also a mysterium tremendum. It provokes terror because it presents itself as
overwhelming power. Finally, the numinous presents itself as fascinans, as merciful and gracious.